
























































transfers  to  consumers  (voters)  at  the  expense  of  firms’  previous  sunk  investments. 
Shortermism  and  political  opportunism  to  extract  economic  quasi‐rents,  and  so  to  set 
unsustainable  transfers  through  low  prices,  are  ingredients  of  what  we  label  energy 
populism. The economic view of this policy is usually skeptical, to say the very least.3 The 
economy is only transferring the bill of adjustments to the future and the consequences 
may  not  just  be  returning  to  higher  break‐even  prices  but  rather  jump  at  higher 
opportunity  cost  if  production  efficiency  and  policy  credibility  are  damaged.  Second, 
generalized  transfers  through  (usually  uniform)  energy  prices  will  have  a  poor 
distributional incidence as will imply large transfers to the non‐poor. This second fact has 





product  –natural  gas‐  and  soaring  international  energy  prices,  wholesale  markets  of 
natural gas and electricity generation (heavily dependant on natural gas) were severely 
i n t e r v e n e d ,  i m p l y i n g  p r i c e s  t h a t  d e p a r t  f r o m  l o n g  r u n  s u s t a i n a b le  opportunity  costs 
(LRSOC).4 In the case of natural gas, the (so far very competitive) sector could perhaps 
have sustained production plans with a wellhead price below the import parity (which 
relevant  value  is  the  import  price  from  Bolivia)  before  the  consolidation  of  the 
interventionist policies. However, after intervention, sustainable wellhead prices would 
have to move towards import prices. Although the origin and magnitudes in this example 









run  economic  viewpoint.  The  difference  is  important  since  fiscal  transfers  are  actual 
disbursements made by the government to energy producers to account for the difference 
                                                 
1 See for example, Bacon and Kojima (2006) and Artana, Catena and Navajas (2007). 
2 See Navajas, (2006) for analysis of public utilities tariff structures in the Argentine case. 
3 Books and papers on populism within economics have been traditionally directed at macro-economic policies. See 
for instance Edwards (2010).   
4In the argentine case, we submit that this policy took shape since at least 2003. We give room for year‐2002 
policies to attend a transitory phenomenon of coping with a severe macroeconomic crisis. The legal tenants 






between  costs  (or  producer  prices)  and  end‐user  prices.  However,  t h i s  g a p  w i l l  n o t  



































long  run  sustainable  opportunity  costs  (LROC).  The  departure  comes  from  the 













                                                 
6 W e  d o  n o t  c o n s i d e r  f i s c a l  t r a n s f e r s  s e t  t o  s u s t a i n  p r o d u c t i o n  at  prices  below  short  run  marginal  costs. 
Empirical evidence in Argentina shows this to be the case for electricity generation since 2004 and also more 
recently for natural gas.    3























                                                 
7 Some political science rationalizers of populism have emphasized the fundamental role of the “narrative” in the 
emergence and implementation of populist policies (see for instance Laclau, 2005). We have no possibility to 
capture such a (rather vague) dimension in our framework. We are aware that the point may call the attention on the 
fact that policies (as substance) need necessarily to be consistent with discourse (as forms) which in the populist 
antagonist strategy means identifying the winners and losers of policies. When we later say that a populist policy is 
one that seeks the support of a large fraction of the population, in a voting sense, we perhaps should avoid meaning 
any fraction, but one that can be shown to necessarily favor low income and low middle class voters, as the 
fundamental groups in a broader coalition behind populist policies. Regardless of the existence of an equilibrium in 
voting terms, the coalition supporting the transfers need be close to “friends” (low income groups) rather than 
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Intervention  affects  households’  utility  positively8 i n  t 1 g i v e n  b y  Δ 1Veh =  V eh(qeh(P0))‐
Veh(qeh(P1)) > 0. As for (negative) transfers in t2 we further assume that households may 
anticipate that the price increase will be shifted to “outsiders” (the “elites” in Definition 2 
terminology),  represented  by  large  user  tariffs  (such  as  industrial  customers),  intra‐






becomes  Δ2Veh ( θ h)=  Veh(qeh(θh . P 2))‐Veh(qeh(P0) ) .   P a r a m e t e r  θ h c a n  b e  a l s o  s e e n  a s  
affected by the “policy” (definition 2) chosen by the incumbent government in a way to 
communicate or signal voters.9 The incumbent will attempt to convince a large fraction of 


















                                                 
8 Recall that end user prices or tariff that enter into the indirect utility depend on energy prices, so the notation 
q(P).  
9 We do not model a strategic behavior by the incumbent and rather assume that he is interested in gaining support in 
period 1. See Acemoglu et.al. (2010), who develop a model of populism where an incumbent signals voters a single 
dimension policy so as to secure the support of the median voter. In their model the voters are afraid of being 
cheated by right wing politicians promising a populist policy and not delivering it ex-post. This gives rise to 





cross‐subsidization.  Finally,  the  policy‐technology  may  be  endog e n o u s  o r  b e  s u b j e c t e d  t o  t i m e  
inconsistencies.   5
 






This  proposition  states  that  if  the  median  household  perceives  a  net  benefit  of  the 


























While  the  previous  discussion  motivated  the  analysis  of  the  trade  off  faced  between 




In  empirical  terms,  we  seek  to  measure  the  consequences  of  a  sequence  of  prices  of 
natural gas and electricity faced by argentine households. Prices of both energy goods 
were decoupled from long run sustainable opportunity costs (LRSOC)11 since 2003 and 
started  to  converge,  slowly  on  average  and  located  in  high  increases  for  for  some 
households. For LRSOC values we take reference prices assuming that in 2003 energy 
p o p u l i s m  h a s  b e e n  “ c o n s e c r a t e d ”  a n d  t h a t  A r g e n t i n a  i s  s i n c e  t h e n  facing  higher 










outcomes  on  individual  utility  assuming  some  aggregation  (social  welfare)  function.  
Recall from Section 2 that each household h has an indirect utility function Vh = Vh(qeh, qne 
mh),  strongly  separable  between  energy  and  non‐energy  goods.  Socia l  w e l f a r e  i s  





























































(energy)  component  (i.e.  not  to  be  mistaken  with  end‐user  tariffs  that  include 
transmission  and  distribution  costs  as  well  as  ad‐valorem  taxes)  for  natural  gas  and 





















2 0 0 9  t h i s  f i g u r e d  h a d  m o v e d  d o w n  t o  l e s s  t h a n  1 0 %  f o r  h o u s e h o l d s  that  faced  no 
increases  (about  60%  of  households)  and  to  about  32%  for  the  households  with  the 







interpretation.     






























and  electricity  consumed  by  each  household  in  the  survey.  We  are  therefore  able  to 
implement the formulas of the previous section from observed quantities. We also  use the 
distribution of consumptions across households along with household data on income and 




















2003-07 2008-10 201X 201X
1 10.5 27.9 -32.1 -28.9
2 17.9 45.9 -52.5 -47.3
3 22.0 56.0 -64.0 -57.6
4 26.3 66.4 -76.0 -68.4
5 31.8 78.9 -90.0 -81.0
6 37.9 93.4 -106.6 -95.9
7 41.2 98.2 -111.8 -100.6
8 45.0 107.5 -122.3 -110.1
9 45.4 107.6 -122.4 -110.2
10 44.5 102.5 -116.9 -105.2
Total 322.5 784.3 -894.7 -805.2
Source: own elaboration based on ENGH micro-data
Table 1
Natural Gas: Estimated Annual Transfers to Households in the 
Metropolitan Region of B.A.








2003-07 2008-10 201X 201X
1 24.9 52.2 -55.4 -49.9
2 30.1 63.7 -67.9 -61.1
3 36.2 75.5 -80.1 -72.1
4 35.1 74.4 -79.2 -71.3
5 36.6 76.9 -81.6 -73.4
6 39.1 83.1 -88.5 -79.6
7 39.7 84.7 -90.1 -81.0
8 40.3 85.2 -90.5 -81.4
9 42.7 90.9 -96.5 -86.8
10 49.3 104.3 -110.3 -99.3
Total 373.9 790.8 -840.0 -756.0
Source: own elaboration based on ENGH micro-data
Table 2
Electricity: Estimated Annual Transfers to Households in the 
Metropolitan Region of B.A.








T o t a l  t r a n s f e r s ,  f r o m  2 0 0 3  t o  2 0 1 0 ,  t o  h o u s e h o l d s  i n  t h e  B u e n o s  A i r e s  M e t r o p o l i t a n  
Region amounted to 8.2 billion dollars or on average a bit more than 1 billion dollars per 
year. This is, on average, in the order of 0.3%  of GDP per year. Under‐pricing of electricity 
g e n e r a t i o n  ca u s e d  a  b i t  m o r e  s u b s i d i e s  t h a n  u n d e r ‐ p r i c i n g  o f  n a tural  gas.  Despite  the 
correction in 2008 to some households, actual subsidies went up due to a significant rise 
in opportunity costs that are related to international energy prices and to the restricted 
nature  of  price  increases.  As  we  have  about  4  million  households  in  this  area,  every 
household received, on average, an equivalent annual subsidy of about 250 dollars. But the 
distribution of the subsidies, given uniform prices until 2008, was not pro‐poor or pro‐low 
income  households  but  rather  benefited  relatively  more  the  higher  deciles  of  income 
distribution (see Table 3). This is unsurprising given the fact that subsidies were uniform 








Decile Natural Gas Electricity Total
1 3.4% 6.6% 5.1%
2 5.7% 8.1% 6.9%
3 7.0% 9.6% 8.3%
4 8.3% 9.4% 8.9%
5 10.0% 9.7% 9.9%
6 11.8% 10.5% 11.1%
7 12.6% 10.7% 11.6%
8 13.8% 10.8% 12.2%
9 13.9% 11.5% 12.6%
10 13.4% 13.2% 13.3%
Source: Table 1 and Table 2
Distribution of natural gas subsidies and electricity 




A  return  to  opportunity  cost  is  a  reversion  of  subsidies  that  will  imply  transfers  in 
opposite  directions  to  those  observed  in  2003‐2010.  Annual  transfers  will  depend  on 
demand correction but will surely –and given higher projected natural gas prices which 
impact on both estimates‐ be of a magnitude of about 1.5 billion dollars per year (or more 
t h a n  0 . 3 %  o f  c u r r e n t  G D P ) ,  a  l a r g e  f i g u r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h a t  w e  a re  measuring  only 










d e m a n d  a f t e r  p r i c e  c h a n g e s  t o w a r d s  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  i n  2 0 1 X .  T h e  r e s u l t s  s h o w  
significant changes in welfare for households, but in particular for low income ones. As the 
impact of household transfers on utility (welfare) depends on the income or expenditure 



















2003-07 2008-10 201X 2003-07 2008-10 201X 2003-07 2008-10 201X
1 12.0% 29.5% -29.3% 12.9% 31.8% -31.6% 16.1% 40.2% -40.0%
2 8.2% 19.3% -19.1% 8.2% 19.4% -19.2% 8.3% 19.6% -19.5%
3 6.0% 14.2% -14.0% 6.0% 14.2% -14.0% 6.0% 14.2% -14.1%
4 5.0% 11.7% -11.6% 5.0% 11.7% -11.6% 5.0% 11.8% -11.7%
5 4.6% 10.5% -10.4% 4.6% 10.5% -10.4% 4.6% 10.5% -10.4%
6 3.9% 9.0% -8.9% 3.9% 9.0% -8.9% 3.9% 9.0% -8.9%
7 3.7% 8.3% -8.3% 3.7% 8.3% -8.3% 3.7% 8.3% -8.3%
8 2.8% 6.3% -6.3% 2.8% 6.3% -6.3% 2.8% 6.3% -6.3%
9 2.2% 4.9% -4.9% 2.2% 4.9% -4.9% 2.2% 4.9% -4.9%
10 1.4% 3.1% -3.1% 1.5% 3.2% -3.2% 1.5% 3.4% -3.4%
Total 3.4% 7.7% -7.7% 4.2% 9.9% -9.9% 7.3% 17.7% -17.6%
Note: Assumes a uniform 10% demand correction during the populist cycle reversion (year 201X).
Aversion coefficient (v=0.5) Aversion coefficient (v=1) Aversion coefficient (v=2)
Table 4




2003-07 2008-10 201X 2003-07 2008-10 201X 2003-07 2008-10 201X
1 11.2% 22.1% -20.6% 12.3% 24.2% -22.6% 18.5% 36.6% -34.2%
2 6.9% 13.7% -12.8% 7.0% 13.8% -12.8% 7.0% 13.9% -12.9%
3 6.2% 12.1% -11.2% 6.2% 12.1% -11.2% 6.2% 12.1% -11.2%
4 4.9% 9.8% -9.1% 4.9% 9.8% -9.1% 5.0% 9.8% -9.2%
5 4.2% 8.3% -7.7% 4.2% 8.3% -7.7% 4.2% 8.3% -7.7%
6 3.7% 7.3% -6.8% 3.7% 7.3% -6.8% 3.7% 7.3% -6.8%
7 3.1% 6.1% -5.7% 3.1% 6.2% -5.7% 3.1% 6.2% -5.8%
8 2.6% 5.2% -4.8% 2.6% 5.2% -4.8% 2.6% 5.2% -4.8%
9 2.1% 4.3% -4.0% 2.2% 4.3% -4.0% 2.2% 4.3% -4.0%
10 1.6% 3.1% -2.9% 1.6% 3.2% -3.0% 1.7% 3.4% -3.2%
Total 3.5% 7.0% -6.5% 4.6% 9.1% -8.5% 9.5% 18.7% -17.4%
Note: Assumes a uniform 10% demand correction during the populist cycle reversion (year 201X).
Table 5
Electricity: Average Annual Percentage Change in Welfare
Decile








A i r e s  M e t r o p o l i t a n  R e g i o n ,  a b o u t  4 0 %  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  p o p u l a t i o n  and  the  historical 
stronghold of supporters of redistributive politics. If prices were below opportunity costs 
at the beginning of the freeze in 2002, they became astonishingly divorced since 2003 as 
international  energy  prices  soared.  The  presence  of  visible  imbalances  did  not  trigger 
p o l i c y  r e s p o n s e  u p  u n t i l  2 0 0 8 ,  a s  w o r l d  e n e r g y  p r i c e s  s o a r e d .  B ut  the  response  was 
carefully designed to avoid being perceived as a policy reversal. On the contrary, energy 












particular  exploring  the  inconsistencies  for  choosing  the  populist  path  given  that 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  m a y  e n d  u p  b e i n g  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  d i s c o u r s e  o r   narrative  is  an 







E v a l u a t i n g  l o n g  r u n  s u s t a i n a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  a t  w h a t  w e  b e lieve  are  reasonable 

















m o v e  h a s  p a r t i a l l y  b e g a n ,  a l b e i t  s l o w l y  a n d  w i t h  d i f f i c u l t i e s  d ue  to  poor  focalization 
associated with multi‐part prices (associated with consumption levels) that implemented 
large price hikes for a small group of large consumers. We make a simple calculation of 
transfer  losses  on  the  assumption  that  the  gap  is  closed  and  every  household  pays 
opportunity costs. These are distributed in a similar fashion as transfer gains, given the 
assumed proportional (to consumption) adjustment for all households. However, the same 
i s  t r u e  w i t h  p e r c e n t a g e  w e l f a r e  l o s s e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  p o o r  r e c e i ves  the  largest  negative 
impacts.  
 
From  the  previous  results  it  is  clear  that  one  drawback  of  following  interventionist 
policies is the transmission of income and welfare instability to society and in particular 
the  poor.  What  else  can  we  say,  based  on  our  measurement  on  AMBA  households 
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Bs As City Greater Bs As Bs As City Greater Bs As
2003 all users 1.78 0.465 0.501 1.315 1.279
2004 all users 1.78 0.444 0.494 1.336 1.286
2005 all users 2.81 0.378 0.473 2.428 2.334
2006 all users 3.87 0.360 0.450 3.515 3.425
2007 all users 5.16 0.355 0.444 4.808 4.719
2008 0 - 500 8.54 0.350 0.437 8.190 8.103
501 - 650 8.54 0.350 0.437 8.190 8.103
651 - 800 8.54 0.350 0.437 8.190 8.103
801 - 1000 8.54 0.386 0.458 8.154 8.082
1001 - 1250 8.54 0.524 0.599 8.016 7.941
1251 - 1500 8.54 0.645 0.721 7.895 7.819
1501 - 1800 8.54 0.801 0.881 7.739 7.659
1801 - more 8.54 0.915 0.996 7.625 7.544
2009 0 - 500 5.88 0.296 0.371 5.579 5.504
501 - 650 5.88 0.296 0.371 5.579 5.504
651 - 800 5.88 0.296 0.371 5.579 5.504
801 - 1000 5.88 0.388 0.423 5.487 5.452
1001 - 1250 5.88 0.880 0.933 4.995 4.942
1251 - 1500 5.88 1.240 1.293 4.635 4.582
1501 - 1800 5.88 1.999 1.958 3.876 3.917
1801 - more 5.88 2.416 2.325 3.459 3.550
2010 0 - 500 7.27 0.283 0.353 6.990 6.919
501 - 650 7.27 0.283 0.353 6.990 6.919
651 - 800 7.27 0.283 0.353 6.990 6.919
801 - 1000 7.27 0.370 0.404 6.902 6.869
1001 - 1250 7.27 0.839 0.889 6.433 6.383
1251 - 1500 7.27 1.183 1.233 6.090 6.040
1501 - 1800 7.27 1.906 1.867 5.366 5.406
1801 - more 7.27 2.303 2.217 4.969 5.056
Source: Own elaboration as explained in the text. Data from ENARGAS and Secretary of Energy and CBDH for Bolivian gas.
Table A.1
Residential Natural Gas:  Commodity Gas Price  (US dollars / MMBTU)
Implicit Subsidy
Opportunity cost  Year m3 / year
Price included in tariff
 
   15
2003 0 - 300 32.84 9.80 23.04
301 - more 32.84 9.80 23.04
2004 0 - 300 34.25 9.96 24.29
301 - more 34.25 9.96 24.29
2005 0 - 300 41.90 10.63 31.27
301 - more 41.90 10.63 31.27
2006 0 - 300 49.23 10.11 39.13
301 - more 49.23 10.11 39.13
2007 0 - 300 57.93 9.97 47.96
301 - more 57.93 9.97 47.96
2008 0 - 300 80.14 9.80 70.33
301 - 650 80.14 9.80 70.33
651 - 800 80.14 9.80 70.33
801 - 900 80.14 9.80 70.33
901 - 1000 80.14 9.80 70.33
1001 - 1200 80.14 12.18 67.96
1201 - 1400 80.14 12.18 67.96
1401 - 2800 80.14 14.47 65.67
 2801 - more 80.14 19.22 60.92
2009 0 - 300 62.08 8.25 53.83
301 - 650 62.08 8.25 53.83
651 - 800 62.08 8.25 53.83
801 - 900 62.08 8.25 53.83
901 - 1000 62.08 8.25 53.83
1001 - 1200 62.08 13.55 48.53
1201 - 1400 62.08 13.55 48.53
1401 - 2800 62.08 18.58 43.50
 2801 - more 62.08 29.25 32.83
2010 0 - 300 72.06 7.87 64.20
301 - 650 72.06 7.87 64.20
651 - 800 72.06 7.87 64.20
801 - 900 72.06 7.87 64.20
901 - 1000 72.06 7.87 64.20
1001 - 1200 72.06 13.36 58.70
1201 - 1400 72.06 13.36 58.70
1401 - 2800 72.06 18.62 53.44
 2801 - more 72.06 29.66 42.40
Source: Own elaboration as explained in the text. Data from CAMMESA for actual prices.
Table A.2
Residential Electricity Prices in Generation Sector (USD / MWh)
Price included in 
tariff
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Access to Natural Gas and Electricity across 
households in the Metropolitan Area of BA
Table A.3
 